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Legal discourse constructs “truths”, not in relation to legal identity, but also in relation to other categories
of  identity. This article is concerned with a small but important part of  those “truths” – that of  correctly
performed gender identity. It does so by exploring how some legal judgments determine the property interests
of  cohabiting couples in constructive trusts. However, this paper is not about constructive trusts as such.
Rather, it is an interrogation of  law’s language which creates and perpetuates types of  behaviour seen as
legally relevant. It uses a Butlerian approach to offer an alternative way of  conceptualising how an applicant
seeking to establish a beneficial interest has to perform behaviours of  a certain type (usually financial).
Bringing a post-structuralist analysis to bear on this very traditional doctrinal area of  law, the paper
suggests that there is scope for legal discourse to re-evaluate what performances “count” when deciding upon
proprietary interests.
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Introduction
This paper is concerned with exploring how some of  the legal constructions andperformances of  gendered identity come to exist within law. It will argue that law
should recognise (more than it does presently), the plurality of  the learnt nature of  gender
and its performativity. Although the subject matter I have chosen utilises constructive trusts,
this paper is not about constructive trusts per se. There is a multitude of  research covering
this area of  law and I do not intend to compete with it.1 Instead, I wish to offer a different
perspective of  this well-trodden path. I wish to apply Judith Butler’s concept of  gender
performativity to argue that within this context, law continues to adhere to and perpetuate
“appropriate” notions of  gender identity performativity. In so doing, the paper explores the
notion that law continues to use a process of  normalisation of  performativity to perpetuate
certain established notions of  femininity and masculinity, “revealing the implicit
essentialism of  normative judgments”.2 In other words, law only recognises gender as it is
normatively performed, and, as law repeatedly confirms these recognitions in individual
cases, it is engaged in a performance of  its own (i.e. of  application of  the principle of
precedent) and in this way constructs not only the “truth” of  law but reinforces also the
1 See, for example, A Bottomley, “Women and trust(s): portraying the family in the gallery of  law” in S Bright
and J Dewar (eds), Land Law: Themes and Perspectives (Oxford: OUP 1998), pp. 206–28.
2 V Munro and C F Stychin, Sexuality and The Law: Feminist engagements (London: Routledge-Cavendish 2007), p. 201.
“truth” of  gender performativity. This paper offers an interrogation of  “law” and “the law”
and examines some of  the ways in which it continues to produce and regulate identities and
the discourses that surround them.
A brief overview of constructive trusts law
A brief  overview of  some of  the leading judgments in constructive cases will help to
illustrate that performativity of  so-called feminine (and therefore undervalued) behavioural
traits, such as home-making, cooking, cleaning, nurturing, caring and child rearing, which
when performed by women, is evidence of  nothing at all; such activities have little, if  any,
probative force.
Even the black-letter lawyer would agree that only certain types of  behaviour will be
successful in creating and then enforcing beneficial proprietary interests.3 If  the title deeds do
not declare beneficial interests, an applicant has to show that they acquired an interest either
from a resulting trust, a constructive trust or by proprietary estoppel.4 In constructive trusts,
only financial behaviour or performance will be successful in establishing a property interest.5
There is no “clear and all embracing definition of  a constructive trust”6 and the
meaning is “continually developing”.7 Despite the absence of  a universally agreed definition
of  a constructive trust, they generally fall into one of  two categories: firstly, where there is
an express common intention which arises from an express (though informal) agreement,
arrangement or understanding between the parties; and, secondly, where there is an inferred
common intention, which will arise where one party has engaged in conduct referable to the
acquisition of  an interest in the property.8 In both cases, a constructive trust has always
been seen as arising by way of  operation of  the law rather than the intentions of  the
parties.9 Interestingly, although the parties may “go to the law” to have their dispute settled,
it will be equity which determines the outcome. Although the common law is considered to
be masculine, equity is considered feminine. Ironically, despite the perception that equity is
feminine, it still embodies the masculine normative values of  gender performativity used by
a judiciary “educated and embodied in ways that make them deaf  to the pleadings of  ‘the
other’, the woman”.10
Within the context of  cohabitation disputes, the ongoing existence of  this requirement
continues to privilege financial behaviour and excludes those individuals who have never
made (or made very little) direct financial contributions. When Butler argues that gender is
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3 Married couples are dealt with under Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and civil partners under the Civil
Partnership Act 2005.
4 Hayton has argued that it is possible for a claimant to bring a claim under proprietary estoppel, although there
has been debate about whether there is indeed a difference between a constructive trust and proprietary
estoppel, or whether the difference is merely illusory, see D Hayton, “Equitable rights of  cohabitees” ( 1990)
Conv 370, p. 380.
5 Trusts of  Land and Appointment of  Trustees Act 1996.
6 Carl Zeiss v Herbert Smith and Co. No 2 (1969) 2 Ch 276, CA, per Edmund-Davies, at p. 300.
7 J McGhee and H Turner, Snell’s Equity, 31st edn (London: Thomson, Sweet & Maxwell 2000), p 192.
8 Law Commission, Cohabitation: The financial consequences of  relationship breakdown No 307 Cm 7182 (Norwich:
TSO 2007).
9 S Wong, “Constructive trusts over the family home: lessons to be learned from other Commonwealth
jurisdictions?” (1998) 18(3) Legal Studies 369–90, p. 370.
10 P Pether, “Measured judgments: histories, pedagogies, and the possibility of  equity” (2002) 14(3) Law and
Literature 519. See also R Mackenzie, who has suggested that equity “is frequently marginalised as elusive,
uncertain, irrational, subjective, quintessentially feminine”. This is in contrast to a common law which is
“purportedly authoritative as precedent-based, rational, objective and certain”: R Mackenzie, “Beauty and the
beastly bank: what should equity’s fairy wand do?” in A Bottomley (ed.), Feminist Perspectives on the Foundational
Subjects of  Law (London: Routledge-Cavendish 1996).
a “set of  repeated acts . . .. that congeal over time to produce the meaning of  substance, of
a natural sort of  being”,11 her analysis can be applied to law, allowing us to view law as a
set of  repeated stylised acts; a set of  repeated performances which lawyers call the common
law of  precedent. It follows, therefore, that the authority and force of  judgments rest upon
the repeated performances of  previous judgments. In the light of  this, it might be helpful
to briefly examine some of  the leading cases decided since the 1970s.
Arguably, any examination of  the doctrine of  constructive trusts should perhaps, start
with the case of  Gissing v Gissing. Mrs Gissing had been married to Mr Gissing for 16 years
and had paid substantial sums towards the upkeep of  the house, but the house had been
conveyed into the sole name of  Mr Gissing. Mrs Gissing had made no direct contributions
towards its purchase. On their divorce, she attempted to claim a beneficial interest. 
Lord Diplock held that in the absence of  direct financial contributions to the purchase
price, and where the legal title to a property was owned by one person, cohabitees could
only successfully claim a beneficial interest in the property if  they could provide evidence
that both cohabitees had a common intention that the beneficial interest would be shared. In
addition, it also had to be evidenced that the legal owner had induced the beneficiary to act
to their own detriment in reliance of  this agreement. Lord Diplock explained it thus:
[A trust] is created . . . whenever the trustee has so conducted himself  that it would
be inequitable to allow him to deny to the cestui que trust a beneficial interest in
the land acquired. And he will be held so to have conducted himself  if  by his words
or conduct he has induced the cestui que trust to act to his own detriment in the
reasonable belief  that by so acting he was acquiring a beneficial interest in the
land.12 (emphasis added)
Performativity in the guise of  “behaviour”, “conduct” and “acting” were clearly types of
behaviours important to the court here. The court held (unanimously) that there was no
beneficial interest acquired here by the wife, firstly, because she had made no financial
contribution to the purchase price of  the property and, secondly, because she had failed to
establish the necessary common intention. Thus, her behaviour, her conduct and her acts
were not deemed to be legally relevant, whereas the conduct, behaviour and acts of  Mr
Gissing were. Judgments that only recognise certain types of  behavioural function and
commitment became a pattern throughout subsequent cases. Eves v Eves13 is another
example. This case is often used to illustrate the (mistaken) understanding that non-financial
conduct can establish a beneficial interest. In Eves v Eves, the court was more concerned that
an errant husband should not be allowed to benefit from dishonesty, than they were with
ensuring a wide interpretation of  what kind of  behaviour “counts”. Janet and Stuart Eves had
lived together for four years during which time a house had been paid for by and conveyed
into Stuart Eves’ sole name. Janet Eves had been explicitly led by Stuart Eves to believe when
they set up home together that the property would belong to them jointly and that the only
reason the legal title was vested solely in his name was because she was then under 21. She
later moved out of  the house with the children and claimed a beneficial interest. The Court
of  Appeal imposed a constructive trust on the house and awarded her a quarter share.
Janet Eves’ conduct and behaviour were not considered legally relevant (she had
undertaken redecoration, demolition of  a garden shed, used a 14-pound sledgehammer to
break up an area of  concrete at the front of  the house and, of  course, been in an intimate
cohabiting relationship for four years). Again, similar to Gissing v Gissing, Janet Eves’
It’s not me, it’s you
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12 [1971] AC 886, per Diplock, p. 905B–C
13 [1975] 1 WLR 1338.
189
performativity of  her gender – her acts, her conduct – were not legally relevant to the court.
Ironically, it was the dishonest behaviour of  Stuart Eves in misrepresenting the age
requirement which influenced the court’s decision. However, future cases mistakenly relied
on this aspect in the hope of  demonstrating that physical labour counts. 
Arguably, one of  the most infamous cases in this area of  law is still Burns v Burns.14 The
performance of  the so-called feminine behaviour of  looking after the home and the
children was not enough to support the necessary inference of  common intention. The
facts are well known: the couple had cohabited for 19 years, 17 of  those years in their home
which was registered in his sole name. She made no financial contribution to the purchase
price or subsequent mortgage. Valerie Burns’ behaviour was constituted by being in an
intimate relationship for 19 years, looking after the home and having primary responsibility
for raising the couple’s two children. Valerie Burns had not been able to undertake paid
employment due to her domestic responsibilities and, in the few times when she had had
some income, she had used the money for the children or family expenses.15 It was held
that she was not entitled to a beneficial interest in the property – her behaviour had not
been sufficiently financial. Valerie Burns’ performatively constituted gender role meant that
she did not behave “correctly”. The failure of  the court to recognise her contribution was
due to the courts’ inability to recognise behaviour and conduct that was other than financial.
These early examples clearly demonstrate that performativity of  so-called feminine
traits was of  no legal interest to the courts. Relying as they do on the repeated set of  stylised
acts of  precedent, it is no surprise that the later cases are no different. For example, in James
v Thomas, the Court of  Appeal gave some interesting comments on what kinds of  behaviour
and words might be capable of  giving rise to a constructive trust. The leading judgment
(given by Sir John Chadwick) stated that the couple had lived together “as husband and
wife” for 15 years (emphasis added). The use of  the word “as” in that sentence raises an
issue of  performativity. Chadwick stated that the woman’s evidence “as to which there was
no real dispute . . . was that she drove a tipper, dug trenches, picked up materials, laid
concrete, tarmac and gravel and generally undertook (alongside Mr Thomas) the manual
work associated with a business of  that nature”.16
In fact, in relation to Ms James’ improvement of  the property, Chadwick refers to “the
near Herculean labours of  the Claimant”.17 Despite this, however, the work that she had
done did not, according to the court give rise to the necessary “detrimental reliance”. Her
behaviour did not count because “in the absence of  an express post-acquisition agreement,
a court will be slow to infer from conduct alone that parties intended to vary existing beneficial
interests established at the time of  acquisition”18 (emphasis added). Indeed, Chadwick was
firmly of  the opinion that what Ms James was doing gave rise “to no inference that the
parties had agreed (or had reached a common understanding) that she was to have a share
in the property: what she was doing was wholly explicable on other grounds”.19 The “other
grounds” were because “she and Mr Thomas were making their life together as man and
wife”, the clear implication being here that it was not financial self-interest, but for reasons
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 63(2)
14 [1984] 1 All ER 244.
15 A Bottomley, “From Mrs Burns to Mrs Oxley: do co-habiting women (still) need marriage law?” (2006) 14(2)
Feminist Legal Studies 181–211.
16 [2007] EWCA Civ 1212, per Chadwick, at para. 4.
17 Ibid. para. 11.
18 Ibid. para. 24.
19 Ibid. para. 27.
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of  love and affection.20 It is also clear from reading Chadwick’s judgment that there was
only one way to interpret the words and conduct:
Nor, as it seems to me, can it be said that the observation “this will benefit us
both”, when made in the context of  a discussion of  matters relating to the
business, was intended or understood to be a promise of  some property interest
in The Cottage. Given that the outgoings of  both parties were funded by the
receipts of  the business – and that, from about 1999, the business was carried on
in partnership – there is no reason to think that the observation “this will benefit
us both” (in relation to the business) was more than a statement of  the obvious:
what was of  benefit to the business was of  benefit to both Mr Thomas and Miss
James, for whom the business was their livelihood.21 (emphasis added)
It is clear from this passage that, according to the judge, there was only one possible
interpretation of  behaviour – it was “obvious”. The physical labour was not considered
legally relevant. What was considered relevant was the conversation which included the
sentence “this will benefit us both”. The judge was of  the opinion that there was only one
possible interpretation of  this sentence. I strongly disagree with Chadwick’s opinion that
there is only one way to interpret the words “this will benefit us both”. These words are
capable of  more than one, if  not multiple, interpretations. Chadwick’s pronouncement that
there’s only one interpretation exemplifies law’s idea that conduct is always gender neutral. I
would suggest that this assumption demonstrates an andocentric approach to the
interpretations given to conduct and behaviour, and that conduct, like identity, is
performatively constructed. Chadwick took these words to mean relating only to the business
the couple owned, but they are equally capable of  relating to the relationship between the
couple themselves. If  we apply some of  the work undertaken by Miles,22 Douglas and
Woodward, it is reasonable to put forward the premise that the couples’ understanding of  the
basis of  their relationship was fundamentally at odds with each other. Further, the masculine
nature of  law failed in this instance to comprehend the woman’s approach to justice. The
meaning(s) and importance ascribed to being in an intimate relationship per se – doing
“herculean” physical labour, working without pay with one’s partner – are thus likely to be
different depending upon whether one is performing femininity or masculinity. 
Conduct clearly counts
It is clear therefore, that conduct and performance are the benchmark for the determination
of  beneficial interests. However, whilst this might appear to be an objective requirement
and that there is some tacit acknowledgment that conduct can be constituted by words and
conduct, this is still predicated upon financial behaviour. Thus, “the determination of
beneficial interests is evidenced by what the parties said and did at the time of  the
acquisition”23 (emphasis added). Indeed, various Law Commission reports have recognised
that conduct counts. In its 2002 report, the Commission suggested that conduct was an
important indicator in relation to the question of  quantification of  beneficial entitlement
and that a survey of  the whole undertaking between the parties should be undertaken which
It’s not me, it’s you
20 [2007] EWCA Civ 1212, para. 36. See also S Greer, “Back to the bad old days?” (2008) 158 NLJ, issue 7306.
21 At para. 34.
22 See, for example, J Miles “Property law v family law: resolving the problems of  family property” (2003) 23
Legal Studies 624–48; and also G Douglas, J Pearce and H Woodward, “A failure of  trust: resolving property
disputes on cohabitation breakdown” (2007) www.bris.ac.uk/law/research/centres-themes/cohabit/cohabit-
rep.pdf  (last accessed 2 June 2012).
23 Oxley v Hiscock per Chadwick LJ, at para. 69.
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should take into account “all conduct which throws light on the question of  what shares were
intended”24 (emphasis added).
The Law Commission in 2006 recommended that some couples should obtain
beneficial interests where they could demonstrate “qualifying contributions to the
relationship giving rise to certain enduring consequences at the point of  separation”.25 The
next, obvious questions are: what is understood by a “qualifying contribution” and how
does someone “establish” this? What particular methodology has been chosen to arrive at
a determination of  what counts and what does not count? The Commission states that a
qualifying contribution is:
[A]ny contribution arising from the cohabiting relationship which is made to the
parties’ shared lives or to the welfare of  members of  their families. Contributions
are not limited to financial contributions, and include future contributions, in
particular to the care of  the parties’ children following separation.26
Clearly, one of  the Commission’s concerns in 2006 was to make provision for any
children of  a cohabiting relationship. More precise examples of  what constitutes qualifying
contributions include: care for children of  both parties, both during and after the
relationship; care for other members of  their families, including children who are not
children of  both parties and elderly relatives; financial support of  the family; activities
(whether financial or non-financial) which enhance the value of, or enable the respondent
to acquire or retain, capital assets, including savings and investments; unpaid work in the
respondent’s business; funding professional and other training; and giving up secure
accommodation in order to commence cohabitation.27 In a limited way, these proposals are
almost undoubtedly an improvement upon what already exists. However, it is extremely
doubtful whether the ambit of  what behaviour counts is capable of  being drawn much
more widely than is the case currently. Even if  the Law Commission had been able to
include a much wider range of  legally relevant behaviours, it would not matter much if  the
parties themselves continue to repeat their gendered performances. The Commission was
at pains to stress in its report that:
[F]inancial relief  should not be available simply because an applicant could
establish that he or she made a qualifying contribution. Qualifying contributions
would only give rise to relief  where they had resulted in a retained benefit or an
economic disadvantage. For example, carrying out routine maintenance work on
property in one’s spare time, without adding to its value, would not give rise to
relief. Nor would buying groceries where the respondent was able to pay the
mortgage without that contribution being made.28
I would suggest that both “routine maintenance work” and “buying groceries” have an
easily identifiable financial cost. Further, it is possible that such behaviour could be viewed
by some individuals as “evidence” of  their emotional commitment and intimacy. It is well
documented that there are gendered differences in the ways in which men and women view
domestic labour within the household with studies consistently showing that:
Women, even those who work outside the home full-time, retain the bulk of
responsibility for organising and performing domestic labour including child
care. Although many studies reveal that men are increasing the amount of  work
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 63(2)
24 Law Commission, Sharing Homes No 287 (Norwich: TSO 2002), para. 4.27.
25 Law Commission, Cohabitation, n. 8 above.
26 Ibid. para. 4.34.
27 Ibid. para. 4.44.
28 Ibid. para. 4.45.
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they do in the home, their contribution still falls well short of  what would be
needed to make the division equal.29
The performance of  femininity and masculinity could arguably “cause” men and
women to vary in their experiences and expressions of  intimacy in relationships resulting in
men viewing and valuing certain types of  behaviour differently to how women might view
and value certain behaviours.30 However, given its specific exclusion in the Law
Commission’s report, it clearly does not desire or envisage such behaviour as being legally
relevant, presumably because such contributions could be seen as common incidences of
house-sharing (such as flatmates) and not necessarily exclusive to intimate relationships.
However, whilst there may be instances where it might be problematic to determine where
flatmates end and couples in an intimate relationship begin; it is unarguable that there are
significant, fundamental and legally relevant differences between the two. Indeed, the Law
Commission expressly acknowledged that “intimate” relationships bore the “hallmarks of
intimacy and exclusivity, giving rise to mutual trust and confidence between Partners”.31
There are further disadvantages with the commission’s proposals in terms of  how someone
“establishes” a qualifying contribution. What is clear is that past contributions resulting in
economic disadvantage would still have to be “proved” in evidential terms. As pointed out
by Douglas et al., this could produce “the same kinds of  disputes and difficulties over the
evidence that trusts Law currently generates”.32 The Law Commission’s 2006 report heavily
influenced the outcome of  the case of  Stack v Dowden33 which arguably goes partway to
ameliorating some of  the harshness of Lloyds Bank v Rosset.34 Hale suggests that Rosset had
set the hurdle for a constructive trust “rather too high”. In Stack v Dowden, the House of
Lords held that the beneficial ownership of  a house should ordinarily follow the legal
ownership. Thus, where a property is in joint names and there is no express declaration of
trust, there is a presumption that the beneficial interest is held in equal shares. Hale was
insistent that the parties’ conduct be taken into consideration because: 
The Law has indeed moved on in response to changing social and economic
conditions. The search is to ascertain the parties’ shared intentions, actual,
inferred or imputed, with respect to the property in the light of  their whole course
of  conduct in relation to it.35 (emphasis added)
In Stack v Dowden, Hale was at pains to stress the “holistic” approach taken by the Law
Commission in 2006. At first glance this, and Hale’s emphasis upon the parties’ conduct is
to be welcomed. However, it is still the case that the ambit of  conduct in question continues
to be narrowly drawn. Firstly, Stack v Dowden is only of  use in situations where the property
is vested in joint names. Where only one of  the parties owns legal title to the property, sole
beneficial ownership is still the starting point. Yet again, it would appear that performativity
is called for as the onus falls on the other party to show a beneficial interest in the property
and this can only be done by demonstrating a certain type of  conduct. Stack v Dowden was
discussed at length in the recent Supreme Court decision of  Jones v Kernott,36 where Hale (in
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29 A Diduck and F Kaganas, Family Law, Gender and the State 2nd edn (Oxford: Hart 2006), p. 194.
30 See, for example, M Hook et al., “How close are we? Measuring intimacy and examining gender differences”
(2003) 18(4) Journal of  Counselling and Development 462–72; see also J Ridley, “Gender and couples: do men and
women seek different kinds of  intimacy?”(1993) 8(3) Sexual and Relationship Therapy 243–53.
31 Law Commission, Sharing Homes, n. 24 above, para. 3.6.
32 Douglas et al., “A failure of  trust”, n. 22 above, p. 144.
33 [2007] UKHL 17.
34 [1991] 1 AC 107.
35 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, per Hale, para. 60.
36 [2011] UKSC 53.
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particular) attempted to clarify her leading judgment in Stack v Dowden. The Supreme Court
in Jones v Kernott re-iterated constructive trust orthodoxy by stating that the fact that “where
a family home is bought in . . . joint names . . . . the starting point is that equity follows the
law and they are joint tenants both in law and in equity”.37 In this respect, the judgment
does not say anything new. However, Hale did state that this presumption can be rebutted
by evidence that it “ceased to be, the common intention of  the parties to hold the property
jointly”.38 Again, however, this is nothing new – law is still concerned with “common
intention”. If  we are concerned with asking how law arrives at “legally relevant behaviour”,
we need to know what the Supreme Court in this instance understands by the term
“common intention”. I would suggest that Hale has usually advanced the jurisprudence in
this area by stating that the parties’ “common intention is to be deduced from their
conduct”.39 Indeed, the court went so far as to suggest that although financial contributions
should still be considered relevant “there are many other factors which may enable the court
to decide what shares were either intended or fair”.40 However, the judgment further states
that the couples’ “common intention is to be deduced objectively from their conduct”.
However, it is clear from what has been discussed above that one person’s objectivity is
another person’s subjectivity.
Despite such “progress”, however, Lloyd’s Bank v Rosset is still regarded as a leading case in
this area. Rosset re-affirmed the principle that financial performativity is what the courts are
most interested in ascertaining. In so doing, the House of  Lords failed to acknowledge the
importance of  the performance of  gender roles and, indeed, that gender itself  is normatively
performed. Importantly, Bridge LJ, in giving the leading judgment, was insistent that in the
absence of  some express agreement, discussion or understanding between the parties, even
substantial unpaid labour would not give rise to the necessary intention and he was “extremely
doubtful whether anything less [than a direct financial contribution] will do”.41
The Rosset judgment underlines a continuing intense preoccupation with financial
performativity. Given that masculinity and femininity are capable of  being performed
differently to each other, this requirement privileges masculine performativity. 
At the risk of  stating the obvious, it still remains the case that we are dealing here with
personal and intimate relationships not business relationships; couples “deal with each other
more by trust and collaboration than by organised thinking about their respective rights”.42
Despite the increase in the popularity of  cohabitation agreements, it is still comparatively rare
for couples to draw up cohabitation agreements and/or declarations of  trust.43 Reliable
figures as to how many cohabiting couples enter into cohabitation agreements are hard to
come by, but over half  of  those surveyed in the 2000 British Social Attitudes Survey
incorrectly believed that cohabitants have a “common law marriage” giving them the same
legal rights as married couples.44 The 2001 census shows there were 2 million cohabiting
couples in England and Wales in 2001, an increase of  67 per cent on the figures from the 1991
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 63(2)
37 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53, per Hale, para. 51.
38 Ibid. para. 51.
39 Ibid. para. 51.
40 Ibid. para. 51.
41 Bridge LJ, p. 1117.
42 A Barlow and C Lind, “A matter of  trust: the allocation of  rights in the family home” (1999) 19(4) Legal Studies 473.
43 Actual take-up figures are difficult to come by although there seems to be a proliferation of  companies
offering cohabitation agreements – even Tesco has got in on the act and offers a Cohabitation Agreement
Form Pack for £4.39.
44 A Barlow et al., “Family affairs: cohabitation, marriage and the law” (London: Nuffield Foundation 2002). See
also R Probert, “Why couples still believe in common-law marriage” (2007) 37 Family Law 403.
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census. The number of  cohabiting couples in England and Wales is expected to rise from 2.25
million in 2007 to 3.7 million in 2031.45 Even at a brief  glance therefore, these figures tell us
that there are a significant number of  people who will not be seeking a cohabitation
agreement or something similar. Yet is seems that this is what the courts are implicitly looking
for. Legal discourse continues to expect that the parties’ rights will be determined according
to their common intention – a matter they will rarely have thought it necessary to consider.
Despite attempts at reform in this area, the language of  law continues to operate on the
presumptive level of  financial contributions and behaviour. The most recent statutory
attempts at reforming the law of  cohabitation still deny the existence of  gendered
difference. Lord Lester’s unsuccessful Cohabitation Bill 2008 contained a proposal
(clause 9) similar to s. 25 of  the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Clause 9 would have directed
the courts to test the couple’s “degree of  commitment” in deciding beneficial interests. This
was, however, just another test of  performativity not guaranteed to be free from
preconceived ideas of  the masculine and feminine and the possibility of  gendered
differences of  perceptions of  commitment. In addition to the welfare of  any relevant child,
the matters to be considered by the court included the contributions each party had made
to the relationship in financial terms. There was to have been no presumption of  equal
sharing of  property. The Bill received a second reading in the House of  Lords on 13 March
2009, but failed to proceed any further having run out of  parliamentary time. Another
Private Members’ Bill, introduced in March 2009 also failed to proceed.46 In 2002, the Law
Society had stepped into the fray with its report on cohabitation,47 which placed its focus
upon cohabitation, not just on property issues.48
Various solutions offered
There has been extensive research relating to the question of  how the law does and should
deal with property division upon the separation of  cohabitants. Miles, for example, has
provided a useful analysis of  the conceptual boundaries of  this debate by exploring the
doctrinal differences between the approach taken by family law and the approach taken by
property law associated with people who share homes.49 Miles’ work usefully identifies
some of  the myriad of  problems associated with reform in this troublesome area of  law,
but in particular suggests that these problems cannot be solved “without express reference
to the nature or effects of  the relationship between the parties and an express policy aimed
at dealing specifically with the problems encountered in such relationships”.50 What should
underline any approach, therefore, is not necessarily an examination of  the law per se, but
also an examination of  the basis upon which couples understand their relationship. Barlow
has explored how law is responding (or not), to the trends of  family restructuring away
from marriage in the UK and the rest of  Europe.51 Barlow identifies the UK legal
responses to cohabitation as being developed on an “ad hoc basis leaving the law complex,
confusing and often illogical”.52 Barlow argues for a methodological approach that allows
for an examination of  both “form” and “function” of  the particular familial relationship,53
It’s not me, it’s you
45 Office for National Statistics, Social Trends (London: ONS 2009), p. 8.
46 Cohabitation (No 2) Bill 2008–2009.
47 Law Society, Cohabitation: The case for clear law (London: Law Society 2002).
48 Cited in S Wong, “Would you ‘care’ to share your home?” (2007) 58 NILQ 1.
49 Miles, “Property law v family law”, n. 22 above.
50 Ibid. p. 648.
51 A Barlow, “Regulation of  cohabitation, changing family policies and social attitudes: a discussion of  Britain
within Europe” (2004) 26(1) Law and Policy 57–86.
52 Ibid. p. 60.
53 Barlow, “Regulation of  cohabitation”, n. 51 above, p. 78.
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which would help to provide a “plurality of  legal regulative structures” in response to
diverse family forms. The extensive research undertaken by Douglas and Woodward clearly
exposes the tensions between cohabitants’ expectations and legal positions.54 One of  their
key findings identifies the extreme mismatch between cohabitants’ perception of  issues
over property they have with their partners and the legal view. This mismatch extends far
beyond matters of  interpretation, practice and procedure and is so severe that: “The
redefinition of  their issues into legal concepts may bear little relation to the categories as
perceived from the perspective of  cohabitants.”55
Barlow and Lind usefully suggest that the way forward in this area is legislative reform
which has the best chance of  being able to ensure that “intimacy, trust and collaboration
are significant features in the legal concept of  ‘family’”.56 The authors explore several
different methods in which this might be achieved, but arguably the most convincing of
these is the idea that there should be a legal presumption of  joint ownership of  the family
home.57 On the face of  it, this is an attractive idea. However, of  concern is the fact that it
is based upon the idea that all cohabitating relationships can, and should, be “treated
alike”.58 The basis of  Barlow and Lind’s argument is that it “looks to the degree of
commitment that relationships demonstrate”.59 Whether an applicant can demonstrate the
necessary “degree of  commitment” would be necessarily contingent upon subjectively
assessed factors. There is of  course no guarantee that a court will interpret the phrase
“degree of  commitment” to specifically include the differences between the performativity
of  femininity and masculinity. 
Thus, despite some of  the excellent work that has been undertaken in this area of  law
over the years, the operation of  constructive trusts is still reliant upon a certain type of
behaviour. I do not dispute the principle of  behaviour, what I do dispute is the type of
behaviour that “counts” or is considered legally relevant evidence to intention. I suggest
that what constitutes legally relevant evidence is a matter of  subjective interpretation. That
which constitutes legally relevant behaviour is not the result of  applying objective criteria,
but rather, it is arrived at as a result of  subjectively constituted notions of  the norms of
gendered performativity. Thus, it is not just the behaviour of  individuals within a cohabiting
relationship which should be subject to interrogation, but also the performativity of  law and
legal discourse. 
Applying Butler to constructive trusts
The application of  a Butlerian methodology suggests that much of  law’s authority and
legitimacy comes in the form of  repetition. Thus, the importance of  common law’s reliance
on previous cases cannot be underestimated: “If  the common Law judgment is accepted as
correct, it will be instantiated within the legal system as a general rule properly applicable to
a range of  similar or analogous circumstances.”60
A Butlerian analysis allows for an interpretation of  legal judgments which can be
regarded as a “set of  repeated performances” constituting a discursive body of  knowledge.
These repeated performances purport to constitute a (singular) “truth” – “the law” on any
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 63(2)
54 Douglas et al., “A failure of  trust”, n. 22 above.
55 Ibid. p. 77.
56 Barlow and Lind, “A matter of  trust”, n, 42 above.
57 Ibid. p. 478.
58 Ibid. p. 487.
59 Ibid. p. 487.
60 D E Edlin, Common Law Theory, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law (Cambridge: CUP 2007),
“Introduction”.
196
issue – such as, in our context, that there is only one way to constitute legally relevant
evidence of  behaviour and that that way is financial. This arguably raises the question of
what comes first – does law reflect gender norms or does it construct and impose them?
Butler might answer this question by suggesting that there was “no beginning” as such, only
a “repeated set of  acts”. I would go further and argue that the discourse of  law, as a part of
the society in which it is situated, reflects, constructs and imposes gender norms. Thus, it
would be misleading to ask “Which comes first: law or society?” when, in fact, neither can
exist without the other. The question should be: how do law and society interact to produce
truth and knowledge?
The cohabitation cases clearly demonstrate that law fails to recognise the contingent
aspects of  these truths and the resultant categories of  legal relevance. Butler’s work also
allows for an acknowledgment of  the contingent nature of  the truths that performativity
purports to create. In the context of  constructive trusts, the contested and contingent
categories include “woman”, “man”, “conduct” and “relationship”. These categories are
used by legal discourse in essentialist ways. Butler has argued that some aspects of  feminism
had made a mistake by using essentialist ideas in trying to assert that “women” were a group
with common characteristics and interests. This approach had the disadvantage of
reinforcing a binary view of  gender relations in which human beings are divided into two
clear-cut groups, women and men. Women should not be viewed as a unified homogenous
group as the “very subject of  women is no longer understood in stable or abiding terms”.61
Butler’s theories have the potential to allow for the rejection of  such essentialist constructs
as the antitheses to the potential fluidity of  the categories mentioned above. Such an
approach provides therefore for a site of  resistance to the idea that women and men behave
in certain ways due to biological essentialism and provides instead for the opening up of
spaces allowing for the idea that individuals behave in certain ways because they are
performing their gender.
Butler first suggested the idea that gender is performatively constructed in Gender Trouble,
arguing that conduct is performatively constituted – it is the repeated performances of  a
certain type of  behaviour which lead to it being (mistakenly) regarded as “natural” or “innate”:
Gender is the repeated stylisation of  the body, a set of  repeated acts within a
highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal overtime to produce the appearance of
substance, of  a natural sort of  being. A political genealogy of  gender ontologies,
if  it successful, will deconstruct the substantive appearance of  gender into its
constitutive acts and locate and account for those acts within the compulsory
frames set by the various forces that police the social appearance of  gender.62
Thus, gender is not something a person is, rather it is something a person does – an act,
or a series of  repeated acts. A person’s gender therefore can be viewed as a verb rather than
a noun, a “doing” rather than a “being”.63 These performances and repeated acts and
behaviours take place within different discourses, including the “highly rigid regulatory
frame” of  legal discourse. A Butlerian analysis of  law suggests therefore that, although both
a man and a woman demonstrate legally recognised relevant masculine and feminine
behaviour repeatedly, they do so differently. Thus, as usefully pointed out by Scott-Hunt and
Lim, the legally recognised behaviour repeatedly “heard” or “understood” by law is that of
the masculine identity:
One important reason why equity rarely embodies women’s points of  view is
precisely because there is often no place for them within law and the legal
It’s not me, it’s you
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process to be heard or because, if  heard, they are not understood. The sorry saga
of  disputes over the family home in English trust law is a classic instance of
judges operating entirely within the equitable domain, but failing to hear the
woman’s point of  view or to comprehend her approach to justice.64
The judges can’t “hear” or “comprehend” because in most cases, the women are
performing their femininity as expected. As pointed out by Smart, the discourse of  law
insists on a “rigid distinction between male and female, masculine and feminine, insisting
that certain attributes follow this biological distinction”.65 It is conceivable that the
performance of  gendered identities leads women and men to use language differently
thereby creating different expectations within a relationship.66 Arguably, cohabitants may
have differing perceptions about what “commitment” means in their relationships. Deech
points out that:
Cohabitants have different perceptions about their commitment to each other. In
particular, the man normally does not accept commitment until he has made a clear decision
about their future together, whereas the woman will see it in her moving in.67
There has been some important work, particularly feminist work, carried out over the
years in this field suggesting that there are indeed identifiable differences between the
performance of  femininity and the performance of  masculinity. Work undertaken by
Bottomley in this area usefully exposes that the potential conflict between men and women
may well be due to a “narrative of  differing expectations”.68
For example, Gilligan’s important analysis in the early 1980s opened up the possibility
that men and women use language differently, to communicate different things. Gilligan
argued that women are more likely to voice their concerns in terms of  conflicting
responsibilities and their effect on relationships with others, while men are more likely to
view the world in terms of  hierarchical principles that determine what is right and wrong.
Thus, “the way people talk about their lives is significant, the language they use and the
connections they make reveal the world that they see and in which they act”.69
Tannen writing in the early 1990s, argued that gender differences are parallel to cross-
cultural differences.70 Tannen explored the notion that, when interpreting the cultural
information encoded by language, men and women rely on different subcultural norms.
Female subculture uses language to build equal relationships, while male subculture uses
language to build hierarchical relationships. Tannen’s research opened the door to the
possibility that women place more attention and importance on underlying meanings about
intimacy. Conversely, men, to a greater extent than women, are more sensitive to “between
the lines meanings” about status. Oropesa, writing in 1996, took this slightly further arguing
that responses given to questions about attitudes to cohabitation demonstrate that
individuals can have internalised norms about appropriate and “normal” behaviour with
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respect to their cohabiting relationship.71 More recent work, such as that of  Skeggs, usefully
draws out that law places values on the behaviour of  an individual in an intimate
relationship: “explicit quantification of  value still takes place in Law where the ‘proper’ of
an intimate relationship is adjudicated”.72
The research into the use of  language briefly outlined above facilitates a different
interpretation of  words and actions in relation to property disputes between cohabitating
couples. It allows us to acknowledge the possibility that conversations between men and
women have significance and meaning attached to say “moving in together”. These actions
can mean different things according to whether one is a man or woman or, using Butler’s
argument, dependent on whether one is performing one’s masculinity or femininity.
However, the range of  possible responses, meanings and interpretations are not
acknowledged by law, which continues to advance one singular interpretation of  behaviour
and conduct in intimate relationships. It is, arguably, masculinised behaviour that privileges
and interprets financial behaviour as legally relevant.
Some conclusions
It would appear then that legal judgments continue to construct not only the truth of  law
but also continue to reinforce the truth of  correctly performed masculinity/femininity. If
so, reforms of  the law based on family function or measures of  commitment won’t, on their
own, make any significant difference to constructive trusts because both function and
commitment are still comprehended only in gendered terms and will continue to be
performed by law in the same old ways. However, viewing what is going on through the
performativity lens also means that there is room for resistance. Because truth or identity is
always being performed/constructed/reconstructed, it can be performed differently,
opening up space to understand it differently. Law, for example, does depart from precedent
occasionally, so there is the possibility that legal truth can come to look different. Similarly,
gender performance can shift, so ideas of  proper wifehood/husbandhood/demonstrations
of  commitment/intention are not fixed. However, two things need to happen
simultaneously: firstly, space needs to open up within legal discourse to “test” differently for
functionality or commitment and, secondly, men and women need to begin to “do”
intimacy/commitment/cohabitation differently. Unless these two things happen, nothing
much will change. If  we want to stay within law’s rules of  intention, detriment, etc., we need
law to understand evidence of  intention to share outside of  currently performatively
constructed gendered rationalities.
Given that constructive trusts are “imposed by equity in order to satisfy the demands of
justice and good conscience”,73 it is a source of  continuing disappointment that they fail to
do so in many cases. It is clear that “particularly in cohabitants’ cases, the courts seem to
continue to attach substantial weight to the parties’ respective financial contributions”.74
Cases such as Stack v Dowden and Oxley v Hiscock clearly illustrate that parties’ non-financial
contributions get little if  any mention during the court’s deliberations on quantification.75
Law should take the opportunity to re-examine at a fundamental level what “counts” as
legally relevant behaviour and resist the temptation to adhere to the current persistent and
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performatively constructed overly narrow, rigid idea of  legally relevant behaviour. The
discourse of  law continues to expect individuals to perform their gender roles in the
expected way, but only rewards a narrow range of  legally recognised behaviour
performances. Individuals who are seeking to gain a proprietary interest have little immediate
choice but to perform the gender identity expected of  them notwithstanding that this is a
reflection of  law’s discourse, not an identity of  their own making – as Butler states, the
subject is “led to embrace the terms that injure me because they constitute me socially”.76
The ways in which law and society continue to perceive gender roles arguably lies at the very
root of  inequality of  the sexes. If  we deconstruct socio-legal views of  gender roles, changes
in society might follow “arresting the reproduction of  systematic inequalities”.77
The continuing inability or denial of  law to recognise gendered difference is not to
suggest, however, that we are “stuck” with law’s expected gender performances. Arguably,
there remains the possibility of  a “space” which will allow some degree of  resistance to the
strictures of  power.78 There are ways in which there might be potential for resistance to
some of  the hegemonic norms constructed by legal discourse through “resignification”:
“the site of  radical reoccupation and resignification”. Juridical power conceals the
mechanism of  its own productivity, thus;
Juridical power inevitably “produces” what it claims merely to represent. In
effect, the Law produces and then conceals the notion of  a “subject before the
Law” in order to invoke that discursive formation as a naturalised foundational
premise that subsequently legitimates law’s own regulatory hegemony.79
During the course of  this paper I have attempted to offer an alternative reading of
conduct and behaviour as performatively constituted. If, as Butler argues, the subject is not
formed once and for all, but it is continuously and repeatedly produced, there is the scope
for legal discourse to re-evaluate what performances count when deciding upon proprietary
interests. There is a need to place much greater focus upon the “use of  language”, to move
away from a financial focus.80 I am not suggesting that the ideas presented in this paper
have the solution for the seemingly intractable problems of  cohabitants’ property disputes.
However, the fact remains that, despite numerous attempts and what must amount to
thousands of  hours spent trying to solve the problem, no solution has been found and, at
the time of  writing, does not look likely to be found. Nevertheless, if  there is one relatively
uncontroversial statement that can be made, it is that reform is chronically urgently
overdue.81 Until law recognises the plurality of  the learnt nature of  gender and its
performativity, the property interests of  cohabitants will continue to be determined
according to an inaccurate perception of  identity formation and relationships meaning that
the demands of  justice and good conscience will continue to go unfulfilled.
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